The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 29 (2005)

Article 21

Aboriginal Rights, Resource Development, and the
Source of the Provincial Duty To Consult in Haida
Nation and Taku River
Kent McNeil
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, kmcneil@osgoode.yorku.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
Citation Information
McNeil, Kent. "Aboriginal Rights, Resource Development, and the Source of the Provincial Duty To Consult in Haida Nation and
Taku River." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 29. (2005).
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol29/iss1/21

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Aboriginal Rights, Resource
Development, and the Source of the
Provincial Duty to Consult in
Haida Nation and Taku River
Kent McNeil
The main issues dealt with by the Supreme Court of Canada in its
decisions in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)1
and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director)2 were the nature and scope of the provincial Crown’s
duty to consult with First Nations and accommodate their interests before authorizing resource development on lands subject to unestablished
Aboriginal title claims. Those issues will not, however, be the focus of
this article. Instead, I am going to discuss what, in my opinion, is a
major preliminary issue lying largely hidden in both cases, namely the
source and extent of provincial jurisdiction to infringe Aboriginal title
for the purposes of resource development. In Haida Nation and Taku
River, the Court assumed that British Columbia has authority to infringe
Aboriginal title in appropriate circumstances for the purposes of forestry
and mining, thereby triggering a duty to consult with the Aboriginal
nations concerned. However, although logically that provincial authority
to infringe must be present before the duty to consult can arise in these
circumstances, its source was not explained or even identified.
A good starting point for discussion of this issue is an argument
made by British Columbia in Haida Nation that was dismissed by the
Supreme Court. The province contended that only the federal government has a duty to consult with First Nations in relation to resource
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Tzimas and Kerry Wilkins for kindly reading and offering perceptive comments on a draft. The
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1
[2004] S.C.J. No. 70, 2004 SCC 73 [hereinafter “Haida Nation”].
2
[2004] S.C.J. No. 69, 2004 SCC 74 [hereinafter “Taku River”].

448

Supreme Court Law Review

(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d)

development because section 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867,3 provides that “[a]ll Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the
several Provinces of Canada … at the Union … shall belong to the several Provinces,” and that this provision conferred on British Columbia
the exclusive right to use the lands in question. The Province then argued that this right “cannot be limited by the protection for Aboriginal
rights found in s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” because this “would
‘undermine the balance of federalism’.”4 Chief Justice McLachlin’s
response was succinct and unqualified:
The answer to this argument is that the Provinces took their interest in
land subject to “any Interest other than that of the Province in the
same” [s.109]. The duty to consult and accommodate here at issue is
grounded in the assertion of Crown sovereignty which pre-dated the
Union. It follows that the Province took the lands subject to this duty.
It cannot therefore claim that s.35 deprived it of powers it would
otherwise have enjoyed. As stated in St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber
Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 A.C. 46 (P.C.), lands in the Province are
“available to [the Province] as a source of revenue whenever the estate
of the Crown is disencumbered of the Indian title” (p.59). The
Crown’s argument on this point has been canvassed by this Court in
Delgamuukw [infra, note 7], at para. 175, where Lamer C.J. reiterated
the conclusions in St. Catherine’s Milling, [infra, note 6]. There is
5
therefore no foundation to the Province’s argument on this point.

While McLachlin C.J.’s point that the duty to consult and accommodate
is grounded in Crown assertion of sovereignty and therefore pre-dated
Confederation is important, it will not be pursued here. Nor will I discuss the connection she drew between this duty and Aboriginal interests
in section 109 lands. Instead, my focus will be on her reliance on St.
Catherine’s Milling and Delgamuukw, and the light those decisions may
shed on the source of provincial authority to infringe Aboriginal land
rights.
As stated by McLachlin C.J., in St. Catherine’s Milling the Privy
Council decided that section 109 gave the provinces a beneficial interest
in lands subject to Aboriginal or Indian title, “available to them as a

3
4
5

30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
Haida Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 58, quoting from the Crown’s factum, at para. 96.
Id., at para. 59.
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source of revenue whenever the estate of the Crown is disencumbered of
the Indian title.”6 A necessary implication of this is that the provinces’
beneficial interest is not available to them until the land is disencumbered of the Aboriginal title. This is because, given the Privy Council’s
decision that Aboriginal title is an “Interest other than that of the Province” within the meaning of section 109,7 the provinces’ proprietary
interest is limited by a pre-existing proprietary interest. Moreover, because section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, gives the Parliament
of Canada exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for
the Indians,” the provinces have no authority to remove the encumbrance of Aboriginal title by extinguishing it themselves.8 For constitutional reasons that predate the enactment of section 35 in 1982, the
provinces’ entitlement to natural resources on Aboriginal title lands
depends on removal of that encumbrance by the federal government.9
In St. Catherine’s Milling, the Privy Council declined to define Aboriginal title, beyond describing it as “a personal and usufructuary
right,”10 a description that Judson J. in Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General) regarded as unhelpful in explaining what Aboriginal
title means.11 Not until the Delgamuukw decision in 1997 did the Supreme Court provide us with a clear definition of Aboriginal title as “the
right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that
title for a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of those aborig6

St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46, at 59
[hereinafter “St. Catherine’s Milling”].
7
Id., at 58; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R.
1010, at para. 175 [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”].
8
This conclusion, which was at least implicit in St. Catherine’s Milling, supra, note 6,
was explicitly affirmed in Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at paras. 172-81. See also Paul v. British
Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), [2003] S.C.J. No. 34, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585, at para. 28
[hereinafter “Paul”].
9
See Hamar Foster, “Aboriginal Title and the Provincial Obligation to Respect It: Is
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia ‘Invented Law’?” (1998) 56:2 The Advocate 221. Prior to the
enactment of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, extinguishment could have been accomplished by
clear and plain federal legislation as well as by treaty, but due to s. 35, unilateral legislative extinguishment of Aboriginal rights is no longer possible: R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77,
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at para. 28 (Lamer C.J.) [hereinafter “Van der Peet”]; Mitchell v. Canada
(Minister of National Revenue), [2001] S.C.J. No. 33, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, at para. 11 (McLachlin
C.J.). For detailed discussion see Kent McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada:
Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial Discretion” (2001-2002) 33 Ottawa L. Rev. 301.
10
St. Catherine’s Milling, supra, note 6, at 54.
11
[1973] S.C.R. 313, at 328. See also Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, at 37982 (Dickson J.) [hereinafter “Guerin”].
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inal practices, customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive
aboriginal cultures.”12 The Court clearly regarded this title as encompassing a beneficial right to natural resources such as timber, minerals,
oil and gas, although access to those resources might be impeded by an
inherent limit that prevents the lands from being used in ways that are
irreconcilable with the Aboriginal attachment to the land giving rise to
the title.13
This definition of Aboriginal title assists us in understanding the nature of the provincial Crown’s underlying title to Aboriginal title lands
that was acknowledged in St. Catherine’s Milling and affirmed in
Delgamuukw. Although it was already apparent from St. Catherine’s
Milling that for constitutional division-of-property and division-ofpowers reasons the provinces cannot take advantage of timber resources
on lands that continue to be subject to Aboriginal title, we now know for
sure from Delgamuukw that the beneficial interest in those resources is
actually vested in the Aboriginal titleholders rather than in the Crown in
right of the provinces. In other words, it is the Aboriginal titleholders,
not the provinces, that own the natural resources, including timber, on
their lands.14 Thus, the provinces cannot access those resources because,
in addition to being prevented from doing so by exclusive federal jurisdiction over Aboriginal title, the provinces do not own the resources. In
order to access them, the provinces therefore would first have to either
acquire ownership of them (e.g., by a valid surrender of the Aboriginal
title in a treaty negotiated with the federal Crown, as was held to have
occurred in St. Catherine’s Milling), or have the authority to expropriate
them from the Aboriginal titleholders (this would require constitutionallyvalid legislation).15 So for as long as Aboriginal title exists, the provinc12

Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at para. 117 (Lamer C.J.).
For critical commentary on the inherent limit, see “The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and
Content of Aboriginal Title”, in Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in
Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001) 102, at
116-22 [hereinafter “Emerging Justice?”].
14
The word “own” is, I think, appropriate because the Supreme Court clearly regarded
Aboriginal title and the right to natural resources encompassed by it as proprietary: see
Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at para. 113, and discussion in Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title as a
Constitutionally Protected Property Right”, in Owen Lippert, ed., Beyond the Nass Valley: National
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2000) 55,
at 57-61 (also in Emerging Justice?, supra, note 13, 292, at 295-301).
15
The Crown does not have prerogative authority to expropriate property in peacetime,
and so needs unequivocal legislative authority to do so: see discussion in McNeil, supra, note 9, at
308-11; McNeil, supra, note 14, at 56-57 (Emerging Justice?, supra, note 13, at 293-95).
13
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es’ underlying title clearly does not include entitlement to natural resources on the lands that are subject to it.
This conclusion is confirmed by the way Lamer C.J. dealt with the
section 109 argument presented by British Columbia in Delgamuukw. In
response to British Columbia’s contention that the underlying title to
Aboriginal title lands conferred on the province by section 109 is a
“right of ownership” that carries “with it the right to grant fee simples
which, by implication, extinguish aboriginal title,” he said that this argument “fails to take account of the language of section 109,” which
subjects provincial ownership to “any Interest other than that of the
Province in the same.”16 This prevents the province from using section
109 to extinguish Aboriginal title, a conclusion that is also consistent
with exclusive federal jurisdiction over Aboriginal title lands. The
broader implication of this is obvious: section 109 not only limits provincial ownership to interests not encompassed by Aboriginal title, but
together with section 91(24) prevents the Crown in right of the province
from granting interests inconsistent with Aboriginal title. This is
straightforward application of a fundamental common law maxim,
namely nemo dat quod non habet (no one can give what he or she does
not have), combined with a division-of-powers restriction on provincial
jurisdiction.
In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J. nonetheless said that the provinces can
infringe Aboriginal title for purposes like forestry and mining development, as long as the infringement can be justified under the Sparrow
test,17 as elaborated on in R. v. Gladstone.18 From our discussion so far,
it is evident that this authority to infringe cannot be found in section 109
and the provincial Crown’s underlying title. That title co-exists with,
and is subject to, Aboriginal title. It is a proprietary interest that is limited by another, pre-existing property interest that entails the right of
exclusive occupation and use of the land and the natural resources on
and under it.19 So if the provinces have the constitutional authority to
infringe Aboriginal title, that authority must be jurisdictional rather than

16

Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at para. 175.
R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. This test requires the Crown
to prove it has a valid legislative objective for the infringement and has respected the fiduciary
obligations it owes to the Aboriginal peoples.
18
[1996] S.C.J. No. 79, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 [hereinafter “Gladstone”].
19
See Guerin, supra, note, 11, at 379; Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at paras. 112-24.
17
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proprietary in nature. But where in the Constitution is this jurisdictional
authority to be found?
Unfortunately, the Delgamuukw decision did not provide an answer
to this question. One might suppose, however, that the principal sources
of this provincial jurisdiction are located in section 92(13) (“Property
and Civil Rights in the Province”) and section 92A (regarding nonrenewable natural resources, forestry resources, and electrical energy). 20
As Aboriginal title is a property interest, at first glance it would appear
to come within the scope of section 92(13). Natural resources on or
under Aboriginal title lands would also appear to come within the general scope of section 92A. But this is not an adequate answer because
section 91(24) removes Aboriginal title lands and thus the resources that
are part of them from section 92(13) and section 92A jurisdiction by
conferring exclusive authority over them on Parliament.21 This prevents
the provinces from enacting valid legislation in relation to “Lands reserved for the Indians,” including Aboriginal title lands.22 Valid provincial legislation of general application (that does not target Aboriginal
lands) can nonetheless apply of its own force on lands so reserved,23 but
not if it relates to possession or use of lands.24 This must mean that
provincial jurisdiction to infringe Aboriginal title, if it exists at all, is
very limited indeed.25 It must be restricted to provincial laws that are

20
The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, as amended by s. 50 of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Sch. B to the Canada Act 1982, (U.K.) 1982, c. 11.
21
Section 91(1A) likewise removes “The Public Debt and Property” from provincial jurisdiction by conferring exclusive authority over them on Parliament: see Kerry Wilkins, “Negative
Capacity: Of Provinces and Lands Reserved for the Indians” (2002) 1 Indigenous L.J. 57, at 59-60.
Note that most natural resources, such as minerals and growing timber, are presumed to be part of
the land itself until physically separated from it.
22
See R. v. Dick, [1985] S.C.J. No. 62, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309, [1985] 4 C.N.L.R. 55 [hereinafter “Dick”]; Derrickson v. Derrickson, [1986] S.C.J. No. 16, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285, [1986] 2
C.N.L.R. 45 [hereinafter “Derrickson”]; Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at paras. 173-76.
23
See Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America, [1980] 1 S.C.R.
1031 (labour relations); R. v. Francis, [1998] S.C.J. No. 43, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (traffic laws);
Paul, supra, note 8, at para. 33 (jurisdiction of provincial tribunals).
24
Derrickson, supra, note 22; R. v. Isaac, [1975] N.S.J. No. 412, 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460 (C.A.);
Corporation of Surrey v. Peace Arch Enterprises, [1970] B.C.J. No. 538, 74 W.W.R. 380 (C.A.).
See discussion in Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Division of Powers: Rethinking Federal
and Provincial Jurisdiction” (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 431, at 457-65 (also in Emerging Justice?,
supra, note 13, 249, at 272-80).
25
For more detailed discussion, see Nigel Bankes, “Delgamuukw, Division of Powers and
Provincial Land and Resource Laws: Some Implications for Provincial Resource Rights” (1998) 32
U.B.C.L. Rev. 317; Kerry Wilkins, “Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights” (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 185;
McNeil, supra, note 24.
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valid under a provincial head of power, but that are not sufficiently
related to possession or use of land that they cross over into federal
jurisdiction over Aboriginal title. It would therefore appear that the only
provincial laws capable of infringing Aboriginal title without violating
the constitutional division-of-powers would be provincial laws that are
not directly in relation to land and that have only an incidental effect on
Aboriginal title.26
There is, however, a compelling argument against any provincial jurisdiction to infringe Aboriginal title, even incidentally. The
Delgamuukw decision itself held that Aboriginal title, along with other
Aboriginal rights, is within the core of federal jurisdiction over “Indians,
and Lands reserved for the Indians,” and so is protected against extinguishment by provincial laws by the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.27 In reaching this conclusion, Lamer C.J. relied in part on Dick
v. The Queen,28 where Beetz J. for a unanimous Court held that provincial laws, even though of general application and otherwise constitutionally valid, cannot apply ex proprio vigore (of their own force) to
Indians if they impair Indian status or capacity or go to the core of
Indianness.29 In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J. related this core of Indianness
to section 35 rights. After referring to Beetz J.’s observation that the
core of Indianness encompasses activities “at the centre of what they
[Indians] do and what they are,” the Chief Justice said:
But in Van der Peet, I described and defined the aboriginal rights that
are recognized and affirmed by s.35(1) in a similar fashion, as
protecting the occupation of land and the activities which are integral
to the distinctive aboriginal culture of the group claiming the right. It
follows that aboriginal rights are part of the core of Indianness at the
heart of s.91(24). Prior to 1982, as a result, they could not be
30
extinguished by provincial laws of general application.

Although Lamer C.J. limited his holding in this regard to lack of
provincial authority to extinguish Aboriginal title, his reliance on the
Dick decision is significant. That case was not about the extinguishment,

26

See Paul, supra, note 8, at paras. 14-16; Wilkins, supra, note 21.
Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at paras. 177-81.
28
Supra, note 22.
29
See also Paul, supra, note 8, at paras. 6, 16, 49.
30
Delgamuukw, supra, note 7 at para. 181, referring to Van der Peet, supra, note 8. See also Paul, supra, note 7, at para. 33.
27
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or indeed even the existence, of an Aboriginal right. Instead, it involved
the application to a member of the Alkali Lake Band of Shuswap people
of a British Columbia game law restricting hunting to open season. The
Court held that if the game law impaired the Indianness of the appellant
(which the Court assumed without deciding), then it “could not apply to
the appellant ex proprio vigore, and, in order to preserve its constitutionality, it would be necessary to read it down to prevent its applying to
the appellant in the circumstances of this case.”31 The Court went on to
decide that, on the assumption that the provincial law went to the core of
Indianness, it would be referentially incorporated by section 88 of the
Indian Act32 and so apply to the appellant as federal law. The Dick case
is therefore authority for the general principle that any provincial law
that impairs Indian status or capacity or that goes to the core of
Indianness cannot apply to Indians of its own force because otherwise it
would impinge on exclusive federal jurisdiction under section 91(24).33
This is a division-of-powers principle that predates and thus does not
depend on section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.34 Nor does its application depend on occupation of the field and federal paramountcy
(which were not involved in Dick). Rather, it is the direct result of the
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, which prevents provincial laws
from applying so as to affect the core of federal heads of power.
The combined effect of the Dick and Delgamuukw decisions would
thus appear to be as follows. Provincial laws, even laws of general application that are not aimed at or do not single out section 91(24) “Indians,” cannot apply to them if they impair their status or capacity or go to
the core of Indianness. To have this unconstitutional impact, the provincial laws in question would not even have to infringe, let alone extinguish, an Aboriginal right.35 However, given that Aboriginal rights
generally, and Aboriginal title in particular, are “part of the core of

31

Dick, supra, note 22, at 23.
R.S.C. 1970, c. I-6, now R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5.
33
See also R. v. Morris, [2004] B.C.J. No. 400, [2004] 2 C.N.L.R. 219 (C.A.) [hereinafter
“Morris”], leave to appeal granted by the S.C.C. November 12, 2004.
34
This was expressly acknowledged by Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw: see the quotation accompanying note 30, compare notes 44, 48-50, below.
35
See also Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 751;
Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), [2002] S.C.J.
No. 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R 146, at paras. 74-78.
32
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Indianness at the heart of section 91(24),”36 any provincial laws that
infringe those rights would necessarily go to the core of Indianness and
so could not apply of their own force. If those laws are to apply to Indians, they can only do so by referential incorporation into federal law.37
How then is one to explain Lamer C.J.’s assertion in Delgamuukw
that “[t]he aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s.35(1), including Aboriginal title, … may be infringed, both by federal (e.g., Sparrow
[supra, note 17]) and provincial (e.g., Côté, [infra, note 39]) governments”?38 This statement certainly suggests that provincial laws can
infringe those rights of their own force, not just through referential incorporation into federal law. Looking at R. v. Côté,39 the authority he
relied upon for provincial authority to infringe, two things should be
noted. First, no actual provincial infringement of an Aboriginal right by
provincial law occurred in that case, as the Supreme Court held that the
law in question facilitated rather than restricted the Aboriginal right.40 It
was therefore unnecessary for the Court to decide that the provinces
have the constitutional authority to infringe Aboriginal rights.41 More
importantly, the Court apparently decided this vital constitutional issue
without mentioning the Dick decision, without explicit acknowledgement of the relevance of section 91(24), and without discussion of the
division-of-powers issue or the applicability of the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity. Justice Lamer, in a judgment concurred in
by the other members of the Court,42 simply said this:
In Sparrow, the Court set out the applicable framework for identifying
the infringement of an aboriginal right or treaty right under s.35(1) of

36

Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at para. 181 (see quotation accompanying note 30 above).
See R. v. Alphonse, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1402, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 19 (C.A.); Morris, supra, note 33. Although space does not allow me to go into the matter at this time, it needs to be said
that referential incorporation by s. 88 of the Indian Act of provincial laws that infringe Aboriginal
rights, especially Aboriginal title, is also problematic: see Kerry Wilkins, “‘Still Crazy After All
These Years’: Section 88 of the Indian Act at Fifty” (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 458; Kent McNeil,
“Aboriginal Title and Section 88 of the Indian Act” (2000) 34 U.B.C.L. Rev. 159.
38
Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at para. 160. See also Paul, supra, note 8, at paras. 10, 24-25.
39
[1996] S.C.J. No. 93, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 [hereinafter “Côté”].
40
Id., at para. 80.
41
See Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2002] B.C.J. No. 1882,
[2002] 4 C.N.L.R. 117, at paras. 77-78 (Lambert J.A.), reversed in part by Haida Nation, supra,
note 1, without reference to this aspect of Côté.
42
Justice La Forest and L’Heureux-Dubé J. wrote short concurring judgments, without referring to provincial authority to infringe.
37
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the Constitution Act, 1982. It should be noted that the test in Sparrow
was originally elucidated in the context of a federal regulation which
allegedly infringed an aboriginal right. The majority of recent cases
which have subsequently invoked the Sparrow framework have
similarly done so against the backdrop of a federal statute or
regulation. See, e.g., Gladstone [supra, note 18]. But it is quite clear
that the Sparrow test applies where a provincial law is alleged to have
infringed an aboriginal or treaty right in a manner which cannot be
justified: Badger [infra, note 45], at para. 85 (application of Sparrow
test to provincial statute which violated a treaty right). The text and
purpose of s. 35(1) do not distinguish between federal and provincial
laws which restrict aboriginal or treaty rights, and they should both be
43
subject to the same standard of constitutional scrutiny.

With all due respect, before deciding whether the Sparrow justification test applies in the context of provincial legislation, the Court in
Côté should have addressed the issue of whether the provinces even
have the constitutional authority to infringe Aboriginal rights, given
section 91(24) and the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. Had the
Court done so and taken the Dick case into consideration, I think the
answer would have had to be that the provinces generally do not have
this authority.44 R. v. Badger,45 the case relied upon by Lamer C.J. in
this context, does not support any general provincial authority to infringe Aboriginal or treaty rights because it involved the application of
the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements,46 which gave the three
Prairie Provinces explicit constitutional authority in relation to Indian
hunting, trapping and fishing. That was the context in which provincial
infringement of a treaty right to hunt was considered in that case. But
given the absence of an equivalent grant of constitutional authority to
Quebec (where Côté arose) and the other provinces, instead of relying
on Badger, the Court in Côté should have undertaken the kind of division-of-powers analysis engaged in in Dick.
The contradictions arising from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
in relation to this matter can be demonstrated by a hypothetical example.
43

Côté, supra, note 39, at para. 74.
As discussed above, this follows from the Court’s decision in Delgamuukw, supra, note
7, that Aboriginal rights are within the core of federal jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians”: see text accompanying notes 30-37.
45
[1996] S.C.J. No. 39, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 [hereinafter “Badger”].
46
Constitution Act, 1930, 20-21 George V., c. 26 (U.K.), Schs. (1)-(3).
44
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Suppose a First Nation in British Columbia has a special attachment to a
specific site that has spiritual significance for them. The province issues
a licence to a forestry company authorizing it to log the site. The First
Nation proves either a site-specific Aboriginal right in relation to the
site or Aboriginal title to the land on which the site is located, and
shows how the licence will infringe the right or title. Even though this
right or title would be constitutionally protected by section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982, according to Côté and Delgamuukw the province
could still justify the infringement if it met the justification test. Alternatively, without even establishing an Aboriginal right or title, the First
Nation proves that the site is important enough to them that it comes
within the core of their Indianness, or that the logging would impair
their status or capacity. Following the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in the Dick case, the provincial law under which the licence had been issued could not apply of its own force in these
circumstances because it would impinge upon exclusive federal jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.” No justification
of the provincial law could make it apply so as to affect the First Nation’s Indianness. So, the division-of-powers approach clearly provides
greater protection to the site than does section 35(1), even in the absence
of proof of an Aboriginal right or title.47 Moreover, if an Aboriginal
right or title is proven, then, according to Delgamuukw, that brings the
matter within the core of federal jurisdiction, which, according to Dick,
must exclude the application of provincial laws ex proprio vigore. So
how can the province have jurisdiction to infringe?
Let us now return to the Haida Nation case. Because no Aboriginal
title or other Aboriginal right has yet been established by the Haida
Nation in relation to the lands in question on Haida Gwaii (the Queen
Charlotte Islands), it is premature to say that there is an infringement
that the province must justify. The fundamental, unresolved dispute
between the Haida Nation and British Columbia is nonetheless over title
to the land, including the timber growing on it. Looking again at section
47
In Côté, supra, note 39, at para. 87, Lamer C.J. recognized this in the context of a treaty
right and s. 88 of the Indian Act, supra, note 32, and appeared to be somewhat puzzled by it. See
also R. v. Sundown, [1990] S.C.J. No. 13, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393, at para. 48 (Cory J.). In my respectful opinion, the puzzlement arises from a failure to appreciate the fundamental difference between
division-of-powers and s. 35(1) protection for Aboriginal and treaty rights. It should not be surprising that there is no room for justifiable infringement in situations where a province is violating
exclusive federal jurisdiction.
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109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, if the Haida Nation does eventually
establish its Aboriginal title it will have an interest other than that of the
province that will exclude the timber and other natural resources from
provincial ownership.48 In that event, the province will not be able to
rely on a proprietary right as the basis of its authority to infringe the
Aboriginal title. Instead, it will have to rely on jurisdictional authority,
primarily arising from section 92 and section 92A of the 1867 Act.49 But
we have already seen that, given exclusive federal jurisdiction over
Aboriginal title under section 91(24), provincial jurisdiction to infringe
that title, if it exists at all (which I seriously doubt), must be very limited
indeed.50
Let us assume, however, that the province does have jurisdiction to
infringe Aboriginal title to some extent by enacting statutes of general
application. The British Columbia statute authorizing the province to
grant the Tree Farm Licence (TFL) that the Haida contend infringes
their Aboriginal title is the Forest Act.51 That Act authorizes the granting of TFLs and other kinds of licences “to harvest Crown timber.”52
“Crown timber” is defined as “timber on Crown land, or timber reserved
to the government.”53 “‘Crown land’ has the same meaning as in the
Land Act,”54 i.e., “land, whether or not it is covered by water, or an
interest in land, vested in the government.”55 The province seems to
assume that land subject to Aboriginal title comes within this definition
of “Crown land.” We know, however, from St. Catherine’s Milling,
Delgamuukw, and now Haida Nation that section 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, subjects provincial ownership to Aboriginal title. We
also know from Delgamuukw that Aboriginal title includes the right to
exclusive possession and that it encompasses timber and other natural
resources. Thus, for constitutional reasons “Crown land” that is subject
to Aboriginal title must be limited to the provincial Crown’s underlying
title. It cannot include a right of possession, nor can it include ownership
of natural resources such as timber. Accordingly, the Forest Act does
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

See text accompanying notes 5-16, supra.
See text accompanying notes 20-21, supra.
See text accompanying notes 20-37, supra.
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 157.
Id., s.12.
Id., s. 1(1).
Id.
Land Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 245, s. 1.
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not contain the authority to grant TFLs in relation to Aboriginal title
lands.56
For British Columbia to be able to authorize the taking of timber
from Aboriginal title lands, it would need statutory authority beyond
that provided by the Forest Act. What that Act does is provide authority
for the granting of licences to harvest Crown timber on Crown land. To
authorize the harvesting of Aboriginal timber on Aboriginal title land,
the province would have to enact legislation in the nature of an expropriation statute. The legislation could not be aimed at Aboriginal title
land, as that would violate section 91(24) and make the statute ultra
vires.57 It would have to be a law of general application, permitting the
province to authorize the taking of timber from any lands, whether privately-held or subject to Aboriginal title. One can imagine the political
storm such legislation would provoke among private landowners in the
province, let alone First Nations. Moreover, if the legislation was used
exclusively or even primarily to authorize forestry operations on Aboriginal title lands, a court might hold that, despite being of general application on its face, it was really a colourable attempt to single out
Indian lands in a way that violates federal jurisdiction under section
91(24).58

56
Insofar as s. 109 is concerned, the Aboriginal interest should be no different than any
other interest by which provincial ownership of land is limited. Would anyone seriously argue that
the province could rely on s. 109 and the Forest Act, supra, note 51, to authorize the granting of
TFLs in relation to privately-held lands, even though the province holds an underlying title to those
lands as well?
57
See Derrickson, supra, note 22; Dick, supra, note 22; Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at para. 179.
58
Provincial singling out can be either overt or colourable in this context: Dick, supra,
note 22, at 25, relying on R. v. Kruger, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104; see also Morris, supra, note 33, at
para. 118 (Thackray J.A.). It also needs to be emphasized that the scenario presented in the above
paragraph is premised on the assumption (which I do not accept) that the province can infringe
Aboriginal title if the infringement can be justified. In my opinion one has to question how expropriation legislation of this sort, even if of general application, can apply to Aboriginal title lands
without impinging upon the core of exclusive federal jurisdiction that is supposed to be protected
by the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. Surely the legislation, if used to authorize forestry
operations on Aboriginal title lands, would impair the First Nation right of possession that was said
by Chouinard J. in Derrickson, supra, note 22, at 44, to be “manifestly of the very essence of the
federal exclusive legislative power under subs. 91(24).” See also Paul v. Paul, [1986] S.C.J. No.
19, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 306. Although Derrickson and Paul both involved Indian reserves rather than
Aboriginal title lands, the Aboriginal interest in each is fundamentally similar and both are under
exclusive s. 91(24) jurisdiction: Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Town), [2001] S.C.J. No. 82,
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 746, at para. 41; Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at paras. 120, 174-76.

460

Supreme Court Law Review

(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d)

In my opinion, the reason British Columbia is able to rely on the
Forest Act to grant TFLs on Haida Gwaii is that the Aboriginal title of
the Haida has not yet been established, and so for the time being the
province is able to claim that the lands in question are Crown lands
within the statutory definition. But if Aboriginal title to those lands is
established, they will fall outside the statutory definition and so the
provincial authority will disappear. This will mean that the original
grant of the TFL and its transfer to Weyerhaeuser Company Limited
would have lacked statutory authority and therefore would have been
unlawful from the outset. This could render both the province and
Weyerhaeuser liable for wrongful intrusion onto the Haida Nation’s
lands.59 For this reason, I think it is essential for the province not only to
consult with the Haida Nation, as the Supreme Court has decided it
must, but also to come to an agreement with them in relation to the
forestry resources on Haida Gwaii, prudently with federal participation
as a party.60 Although McLachlin C.J. said that the duty to consult does
not include a “duty to agree,”61 in my opinion that conclusion applies
only so long as the Haida’s Aboriginal title has not been proven. So if
the province wants to avoid liability in the future for unlawful interference with the Haida’s title once proven, it had better do more than consult. Given the strength of the Haida’s title claim, I think it would be
wise for the province to proceed on the assumption that the title will be
established, rather than risk the embarrassment and cost of being found
in court to have given Weyerhaeuser the unlawful go-ahead to trespass
on Haida lands.

59

On the availability of an action in trespass to defend possession of Aboriginal title lands,
see Kent McNeil, “The Onus of Proof of Aboriginal Title” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 775, at
796-800 (also in Emerging Justice?, supra, note 13, 136, at 154-58). On liability of provincial
officials for trespass on those lands, see Wilkins, supra, note 21, at 97-100.
60
The reason why it would be prudent for the federal government to be a party to any such
agreement is that Aboriginal title is inalienable, other than by surrender to the Crown in right of
Canada: Delgamuukw, supra, note 7, at paras. 113, 173-75. On the other hand, I am not aware of
any case law holding that Aboriginal peoples cannot, in the absence of federal participation, create
third party interests in their Aboriginal title lands, or alienate natural resources on or under those
lands to a province, as long as their Aboriginal title is retained: see discussion in Kent McNeil,
“Self-Government and the Inalienability of Aboriginal Title” (2002) 47 McGill L.J. 473, esp. at
502-508.
61
Haida Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 42.

